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Regional Parliamentary Institutions: 
Diffusion of a Global Parliamentary Organizational Design?
Michael Giesen
Abstract
In the last three decades Regional Parliamentary Institutions (RPIs) have experienced a rapid increase and 
spread across all regions around the globe. They represent a unique parliamentary phenomenon of inter-
national affairs that first and foremost exhibits a genuine legitimacy nexus between local constituencies 
and the international area. This paper builds on this characteristic and elaborates a legitimacy approach 
that identifies three legitimacy mechanisms that may help to conceptualize the establishment of specific 
design features of RPIs. To this end, a concise typology of RPIs with two disjunctive criteria – election 
mode and connection to a parent regional organization – provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of 
their organizational design. Building on a newly created dataset of 68 globally spread RPIs, the empirical 
analysis generates two main findings: (1) the rapid increase of RPIs after 1989 is empirically corroborated 
for all regions and most types of these institutions; (2) two standard applications of the developed legit-
imacy mechanisms – functional and normative legitimacy arguments – are not significant in explaining 
the choice of specific design features of RPIs. Therefore, the observed rapid increase and global spread of 
these institutions provide tentative evidence to support a diffusion analysis of their emergence and design, 
making the paper call for a more thorough conceptualization of RPIs’ organizational design and processes 
of inter-dependent decision-making.
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1. Introduction1
Since the late 1980s, Regional Parliamentary Institutions (RPIs) have experienced a rapid increase in all 
regions around the globe (Costa et al. 2013; Rittberger/Schroeder 2016; Sabic 2008).2 In contrast to other 
international and regional organizations (IOs and ROs), RPIs establish a genuine link between the interna-
tional or regional scene on the one hand and local constituencies on the other hand via directly or indirectly 
elected national or sub-national parliamentarians who generally constitute the core membership of RPIs. 
Given this direct relationship as well as the mentioned increase in numbers, purely rational-functionalist 
explanations have a hard time accounting for the recent emergence and design of RPIs since they fail to 
conceptualize the underlying currents of legitimacy that effect the relations between the international or 
regional scene and local constituencies (see for instance Clark 2005; Zaum 2013). 
In fact, in the context of the EU’s prime example it has been argued that “the functionalist model fails 
almost completely at predicting the powers delegated to the European Parliament, including its legislative 
and its budgetary powers” (Pollack 1999: 2). From a functionalist perspective, these institutions seem to 
work on the rationale “to counteract or at least slow down” (Slaughter 2004: 107) the forces and powers of 
regional (inter-) governmental integration and may hinder the collective action problem-solving efficiency 
of these regional institutions. 
Therefore, this puzzle might open the door to different explanations for the establishment and spread 
of these kinds of organizations without rational-functionalist informed variables pertaining to collective 
action problems. In this sense, explanations based on a legitimacy approach might additionally provide a 
different perspective on RPIs, their global expansion and institutional design in various regional environ-
ments (for the general aims of these research programmes see Acharya/Johnston 2007).
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to apply some hypotheses grounded in research on legitimacy to RPIs. 
The question driving the paper is what kind of legitimacy conceptions might fit for the analysis of RPIs and 
whether they are sufficient in explaining the emergence and design of these kinds of regional institutions. 
In so doing, the paper finds that diffusion yields some explanatory power in regard to the growing numbers 
and specific design features of ROs underlining the vast room for further research on this topic.
Although legitimacy has garnered quite some attention in the international relations literature, research 
has not paid much regard to gaining more insight concerning the connection between legitimacy on the 
one hand and the development and design of RPIs on the other. The recent debate about legitimacy gained 
some traction with Franck (1990) who uses the term “compliance pull” to show the workings of legitimacy 
1 The research on this paper was conducted in the framework of the project course “Comparative Regionalism” 
held at Freie Universität Berlin and was generously supported by the E.ON Ruhrgas Mobility Grant (for studies 
at the University of Oslo) funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft. The author would also like to thank Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Börzel, Frank Schimmelfennig, and 
Natalia Rojas as well as the participants of the project course “Comparative Regionalism” for their very helpful and 
encouraging comments and suggestions.
2 To clarify, this study builds on the existing research program on International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) but 
focuses on RPIs understood as a regional (supra-national) phenomenon within the (not substantially) larger field 
of truly international parliamentary organizations. See Section 3 for further clarification.
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in politics “among Nations.” Hurd (1999) shows – as Franck does – that legitimacy matters for the research 
on international institutions, and so does Suchman (1995: 571) who “synthesizes the large but diverse 
literature on organizational legitimacy.” This strain of literature has been enriched by Reus-Smit (1997) 
and Clark (2005). The latter combines the concept of international society (inter alia Bull 1995 [1977]) with 
legitimacy and elaborates this analytical framework in a historical perspective. Buzan (2004) develops the 
original concept of international society largely put forth by Bull (1995 [1977]) further into an analytical 
framework that fits today’s world of not only inter-state relations but also of relations between transna-
tional and non-state actors. Connecting this work to conceptions of legitimacy promises to be fruitful for 
research on legitimacy and RPIs.
In contrast, research concerned with Regional (and International) Parliamentary Institutions is an under-
exploited field of study. Early works including Klebes (1988) and Kuper (1991) only offer some preliminary 
definitions and descriptions. More recent differentiated typologies, functions, and conclusions concerning 
International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) can be found in Cutler (2001), Sabic (2008), and Cofelice 
(2012). The last begins to further discuss definitional and conceptual problems such as typologies, and 
develops hypotheses concerned with the empowerment of IPIs vis-à-vis their affiliated regional organiza-
tions by focusing on ten globally spread cases. Most recent works include Costa et al. (2013) who provide 
a research agenda framed in terms of globalization and regionalization as well as an in-depth analysis of 
several types of IPIs ranging from supranational parliaments to inter-regional institutions. Furthermore, 
Cutler (2013) links the current research program on IPIs to organizational understandings of ROs, which 
provides fertile grounds for further research on the interplay between RPIs and their regional environment.
The paper is divided into two parts: the first part develops a theoretical and analytical framework for legit-
imacy research on RPIs, and the second part applies this framework to the empirical cases while focusing 
on the design of these institutions. The first part provides the theoretical framework focusing on concep-
tualizations of legitimacy theory in international relations as well as a typology of RPIs with two disjunctive 
criteria: election mode and connection to a regional parent organization. The second part focuses on two 
independent variables (depth of integration and regime type) in order to map the universe of cases and 
tests two hypotheses concerning the creation and design of RPIs. Finally, the results are discussed, and the 
conclusion summarizes the paper.
2. Legitimacy and Diffusion
2.1	Legitimacy	as	an	Analytical	Category
Legitimacy as an analytical category is understood as “social validity as rightful” (see also Dingwerth 2007: 
14; “soziale Geltung als rechtens,” Kielmansegg 1971: 367).3 This understanding helps to distinguish between 
3 This definition highlights an analytical understanding of legitimacy because it seizes the middle ground between 
describing prevailing legitimacy perceptions and prescribing guiding standards for a legitimate social order. In so 
doing, it seeks to identify the underlying currents legitimacy rests on and affects international order.
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authority as a categorical element and its normative dimensions.4 The social validity of political institutions 
describes an individual experience of a social order as valid (“Geltungserfahrung,” Kielmansegg 1971: 367-
369), which is an experience of normative ligation. This human experience combines a self-perception of 
being able to decide freely while simultaneously being bound to (external) validities that are independent 
of the free will and yet exert an ultimate obligation. In political institutions, this validity is transported via 
the category of (political) authority (Autorität). Authority is understood as a personalized quality derived 
from an experience of social validity connected to personal positions (in a specific social order shaped by 
non-personalized structures) that is expressed through recognition to do something (Kielmansegg 1971: 
368f). As a consequence, political institutions exert “authority when the addressees of their policies rec-
ognize that these institutions can make competent judgements and binding decisions” (Zürn et al. 2012: 
83, emphasis added). Therefore, this understanding of authority in the context of legitimacy highlights 
the differences between legitimacy-based approaches and purely functional and power-based concepts 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997; March/Olsen 1998).
On the other hand, the second dimension of legitimacy is highlighted in the experience of a political institu-
tion exerting a social validity as rightful, which is related to its normative status. This dimension expresses a 
validity of a social order that is often described as having the “right to rule” (Buchanan/Keohane 2006: 405) 
or  as carrying the belief that a rule “ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999: 381). This basic acknowledgement 
of the rightful exercise of authority is situated in “the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a 
community” (Zürn et al. 2012: 83). In other words, it is based on “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). This experience of rightful social validity 
leads to consenting on a status quo or a particular change thereof.
Based on the discussion above, this study understands legitimacy as an undercurrent in international re-
lations and relations between ROs and IOs. In addition, this perspective fosters a conceptualization of 
legitimacy as a dynamic process better expressed as a practice of legitimacy which 
describes	the	political	negotiation	amongst	the	members	of	international	society	as	they	seek	out	an	
accommodation	between	 those	seemingly	absolute	values	 [that	 is:	authority	 claims	by	 institutions]	
and	attempts	to	reconcile	them	with	a	working	consensus	to	which	all	can	feel	bound	(Clark	2005:	29f).5 
These practices facilitate the construction of strategies of legitimation embodied in the membership and 
conduct of organizations. All three may be termed as arguments, since legitimacy understood as a social 
practice needs to be “claimed, sustained, and recognized” and requires agency which involves both “the 
rulers and the ruled” (Zaum 2013: 10).6
4 In this respect, this understanding of legitimacy in (international) order shares a core concept with the recent 
politicisation literature in international relations (Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012).
5 For a more elaborated and embedded understanding of practices as international social action see Adler/Pouliot 
(2011: 4): “practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less compe-
tently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the 
material world.”
6 Note that labelling these logics as arguments does not presuppose an ideal speech situation that is free of 
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In conclusion, members of international society employ various legitimacy arguments as practices of legiti-
macy in order to communicate and justify the authority of their legitimacy claims vis-à-vis certain members 
of the international society that materialize in the establishment and certain design of organizations. These 
members may split in various audiences distributed either vertically (from below to the organization or 
downward from the organization) or horizontally (to other members not subject to the organization´s hier-
archical structure) in the organization´s environment (Zaum 2013: 10-19). In turn, social scientist can detect 
these audiences and arguments and trace them to their grounds of validity or explore the consequences of 
their perceived validity. The latter approach will be employed in the study at hand.
2.2	Legitimacy	and	Three	Mechanisms	of	Diffusion
For the purpose of this study, the complex interaction of legitimation between organizations and different 
national, regional, and international scenes is analyzed through the lens of three logics of social actions: 
the logic of expected consequences, the logic of appropriateness (see March/Olsen 1998), and the logic of 
arguing (Risse 2000). The study furthermore considers the findings on direct and indirect diffusion mech-
anisms, namely competition, lesson drawing, socialization, persuasion, and mimicry (Börzel/Risse 2011: 
5-10). Taken together, three categories of practices of legitimacy or legitimation mechanisms can be iden-
tified (see Table 1). 
Table	1: Categories of Practices of Legitimacy
Legitimacy Argument Direct Mechanism Indirect Mechanism
coercive legitimacy argument force	of	legal	imposition
‘Herrschaft’ legitimate use of force
legal coercion
functional legitimacy argument instrumental	rationality functional	emulation
maximize	the	(own)	anticipated	
legitimacy	function	–	legitimacy-
demand	hypothesis
Politicization / Gap Authority-
Legitimacy 
Internal Norms Demand
(legitimacy) Competition  
Lesson Drawing
normative legitimacy argument normative	or	communicative	
rationalit
normative	emulation
acting	in	accordance	with	
obligations	carrying	a	social	validity	
as	rightful
Socialization / Habitualization
Persuasion
Mimicry
Source: Author, using Börzel/Risse (2011).
The first mechanism is the coercive legitimacy argument. Actors use these arguments either by virtue of 
the legitimate use of force or (legitimate) legal coercion mechanisms given to them. Yet, these arguments 
asymmetric power relations. In contrast, legitimacy enables and constrains power since it is “only within the con-
text of power relations that legitimacy becomes relevant at all” (Clark 2005: 20). Therefore, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the working consensus as a result of a legitimation process “is somehow established and maintained 
in processes that are completely independent of the existing relations of power within the society” (Beetham 
1991: 104). In fact, the practices of legitimacy as well as their resulting institutions reflect existing power relations.
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will not be in the focus of the study at hand since the legitimate use of force to establish and design ROs is 
rarely observed in a society of sovereign members forming (most of) today’s ROs. Legal coercion is more 
likely to occur within legal hierarchical systems, which are also mostly absent in today’s ROs.
The second mechanism is the functional legitimacy argument. This logic can be deduced from the logic 
of expected consequences and applied to legitimacy theory. Actors employing these arguments use legit-
imacy beliefs to justify structures and practices embodied in the strategies of legitimation because they 
maximize the anticipated legitimacy of their own preferences against the arguments of their opponents. 
Accordingly, this practice of legitimacy can be seen as “negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal 
preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains [of legitimacy] to coordinated action” 
(March/Olsen 1998: 949). These gains can be justified on the grounds of shared principles that carry a 
social validity as rightful and, therefore, further the validity of the actors themselves as rightful. In contrast 
to the pure logic of expected consequences, this approach also emphasizes informal, cultural values and 
norms besides shared interests as grounds for strategic actors to define standards of legitimacy and to 
act accordingly during the processes of cooperation. In doing so, this logic facilitates the production of a 
legitimate order “in the absence of an interest-based equilibrium or centralized enforcement” (Rittberger/
Schimmelfennig 2006: 1159). In connection to the existing literature, one type of this kind of arguments 
can be understood as the legitimacy-demand hypothesis which summarizes the direct mechanism pertain-
ing to the processes of politicization (see for example Zürn et al. 2012) or internal norms arguments (see 
for example Rittberger 2012). Functional legitimacy arguments can also include indirect mechanisms such 
as competition over legitimacy perceptions and lesson drawing.
The third mechanism is the normative legitimacy argument. This kind of practice of legitimacy is in line 
with the logic of appropriateness and arguing. Actors employing these arguments use legitimacy beliefs 
because	they are “in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, 
anticipated, and accepted” (March/Olsen 1998: 952); hence, because they are widely perceived to carry an 
obligation rooted in their social validity as rightful. Direct mechanism of this strain of arguments may work 
through either normative rationality or communicative rationality. On the one hand, this involves a process 
of socialization which leads actors to voluntarily redefine their interests, values, and identities in order to 
meet social expectations given in a certain situation, and is often accompanied by social learning (see for 
example Checkel 2001) or habitualization. On the other hand, actors employing these arguments may 
have been involved in persuasion. They may act in an environment where a norm is contested and try to 
“adjudicate which norm applies” (Risse 2000: 6). Here, in contrast to socialization, “actors try to challenge 
the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and […] seek a communicative consensus 
about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their 
action” (Risse 2000: 7). Indirect mechanisms include arguments related to mimicry.
From an empirical perspective, all mechanisms may occur simultaneously, which poses a challenge to the 
research design. Yet, this does not rule out the possibility to hypothesize about the workings of these mech-
anisms and to differentiate between them not only theoretically, but also methodologically and analytically. 
Furthermore, (indirect) normative legitimacy arguments are better suited to showing the independent and 
significant effect of legitimacy in international society than functional (or coercive) legitimacy arguments. 
Legitimacy understood as the validity of (elements of) social order as rightful can best be seen in these 
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cases because of a validity erga	omnes that is inherent to the status of the endorser and not based on 
self-interest or strategic calculation but judged content-independently.7 Practices pertaining to socializa-
tion, learning, or even mimicry uncover therefore most effectively the underlying currents that legitimacy 
rests on in international society. Before applying some of the mechanisms to the empirical research on the 
establishment and design of RPIs, the paper will first address the understanding of RPIs as such.
3. Bringing Regional Parliamentary Institutions in
RPIs are transnational collegial organizations within a given, regionally confined geographical scope and 
with parliamentary principles of operation composed of at least some either directly or indirectly elected 
members. These organizations are understood as regional if they are located between the national and 
global scene – i.e., in a region defined as “social	constructions	that	make	references	to	territorial	location	
and	 to	geographical	or	normative	contiguity” (Börzel/Risse 2016: 7, original emphasis). This definition 
builds on the various approaches elaborated by Sabic (2008), Cofelice (2012), Costa et al. (2013), and 
Rocabert et al. (2014). Yet, note that this study uses the terms IPIs and RPIs interchangeably. The term IPI is 
used when drawing connections to the existing literature, which consensually established this expression, 
and turns to RPIs when analyzing the institutions at hand from a regional perspective. 
Firstly, IPIs are explicitly transnational institutions. This demarcates them from purely intergovernmen-
tal arrangements. Secondly, the introduced definition borrows from an organizational understanding of 
institutions, which provides several advantages (for an extensive elaboration see Cutler 2013). It allows 
attributing to the institutions an independent and significant effect (Ellis 2010) and it points the research 
design to the organization’s environment to search for causes determining the institutional design because 
– as a very basic proposition – the environment composed of its values and practices “enhances the social 
legitimacy of the organization or its participants” (Hall/Taylor 1996: 949). In addition, this understanding 
sets IPIs apart from hierarchical or bureaucratic organizations by assigning them a rather horizontal and de-
liberative practice of decision-making, which is more in line with the present perspective on legitimacy and 
its practices. Moreover, it avoids the pitfall of previous functional understandings defining IPIs on taken-
for-granted sets of characteristics while simultaneously wanting to study “what they do” (Sabic 2008: 258). 
Thirdly, it relaxes some representational demands when opening the spectrum of institutions to directly as 
well as indirectly appointed or elected parliamentarians (that is, members of IPIs).
The definition at hand also provides the ground for developing a typology of RPIs (see Figure 1). Building 
on the works of Kissling (2011) and Cofelice (2012), the typology distinguishes between two disjunctive 
criteria: (1) election mode and (2) connection to a parent regional intergovernmental organization. The 
criterion “election mode” derives from  membership as one cornerstone of the validity of social order as 
rightful since the validity of regional parliamentarians as rightful members of a regional society depends to 
7 This has already been expressed in an understanding of legitimacy as “a general compliance of the people with de-
cisions of a political order that goes beyond coercion or the contingent representation of interests” (Nanz/Steffek 
2004: 315).
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a significant extent on the mode of delegation that created them in the first place. The typology regards the 
election mode creating membership in RPIs as one value on the dependent variable and codes it nominally 
as elected either directly or indirectly. On the one hand, the legitimacy of directly elected parliamentarians 
of RPIs pertains to a practice of legitimacy rooted in transnational principles of legitimacy.8 On the other 
hand, the legitimacy of indirectly elected parliamentarians (mostly members of national legislatures) is 
characterized by a practice of legitimacy rooted in national principles of legitimacy. Since RPIs are under-
stood as transnational organizations, a mode of delegation connected to transnational legitimacy practices 
is assigned a higher degree of legitimacy than a practice pertaining to national norms.
Figure	1: International Parliamentary Institutions – Typology, Classification, and “Incremental Pyramid” 
Source: Author, using Cofelice (2012: 15, 26); Kissling (2011: 13-46).
The criterion “connection to a parent RO” derives from the conduct as the other cornerstone of legitimate 
regional order. In this typology, conduct is understood as the potential degree of rightful exercise of author-
ity vis-à-vis a parent RO and is treated as one value on the dependent variable coded nominally as either 
having a connection or not. Theoretically, this treatment assigns RPIs connected to a parent RO a higher 
level of authority to issue legitimate outcomes than RPIs without a (official) connection to an RO. This 
assumption builds specifically on the works of Kissling (2011) and Cofelice (2012). Kissling distinguishes 
between two types of RPIs, International or Regional Parliamentary Organizations (RPOrganizations) and 
Parliamentary Organs of International or Regional Organizations (RPOrgans), based on their connection 
8 Defining this mode as something “beyond-national” already shows the deep-seated principles of legitimacy cre-
ating primary institutions such as sovereignty or nations/nationalism in contemporary international society; see 
Buzan (2004: 182-187).
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to an IGO/RO. Additionally, each type also has one subtype: Inter-Parliamentary GRINGOs (Government 
Regulated and Initiated NGOs) and Regional Parliamentary Specialized Agencies (RPSAs), respectively. The 
former has no status of international personality, whereas the latter is characterized by free selection of 
member countries that does not necessarily correspond to membership in the parent RO.
Cofelice uses this differentiation and hypothesizes about an “incremental pyramid […], where each layer 
[…] [the types of RPIs mentioned above] adds something to the functions and powers of the previous ones” 
(Cofelice 2012: 15). Therefore, the research design does not consider the effectiveness of RPIs on the 
ground but rather their potential efficacy vis-à-vis an RO. Consequently, it assigns RPIs with connections to 
a parent RO a higher degree of rightful authority than RPIs without such connection.
This typology employs a macro-institutional perspective with a nominally code grid. It is useful for prelimi-
narily mapping the universe of cases and testing hypotheses at a first glance. A meso-institutional perspec-
tive, on the contrary, would enable the research design to elaborate more on the inner institutional dimen-
sions of the dependent variables while still using membership and conduct as starting points. However, the 
focus of this paper rests on the macro-institutional level as a first step in research on legitimacy and RPIs.
4. A Global Diffusion of Regional Parliamentary Institutions?
4.1	The	Global	Spread	of	Regional	Parliamentary	Institutions
As a first step, the study codes 68 globally distributed RPIs that have been established since 1949 (see Table 
A4). The data mainly builds on Kissling (2011: 54-82) and own research. It leaves aside issue-related Inter-
Parliamentary GRINGOs and interregional RPIs.
Figure 2 depicts the development of the selected organizations in time differentiated according to mac-
ro-regions. As a first finding, the number of RPIs globally demonstrates a rapid increase after 1989 (for a 
similar finding see Sabic 2008). This finding also holds for the developments in the specific macro-regions: 
first and foremost for Europe, but also for Asia and less intensively for the Americas. For Africa, there is a 
delay of about ten years leading to a rapid establishment of nine organizations in twelve years’ time.
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Figure	2: Number of Regional Parliamentary Institutions in Macro-Regions since 1949
Source: Author.
As Figure 3 shows, this development can also be observed with varying degrees for all types of RPIs. 
Figure	3: Number of Types of Regional Parliamentary Institutions since 1949
Source: Author.
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Additionally, and in more detail, the second finding also holds true for three elements of the two-dimen-
sional dependent variable: indirect election mode, connection to an RO, and no connection to an RO (see 
Figure 4). Due to the very small number of cases, a valid statement concerning the direct election mode is 
not possible. 
Figure	4: Development of the Number of RPIs with Indirect Election Mode and with and without Connections 
to ROs
Source: Author.
Moreover, the overall share of different types of RPIs has not changed significantly at least since the 
1980s (see Table A1). In 1980, seven percent of all 14 existing RPIs were GRINGOs, about 21 percent 
RPOrganizations and RPSAs, and half of them RPOrgans. Ten years later, in 1990, the overall number in-
creased to 21 RPIs, with RPOrganizations gaining a share of about 29 percent and RPSAs declining to about 
14 percent – all other types staying roughly the same. Thus, the relative share of different types of RPIs 
among the overall 49 institutions in 2000 as well as among the 68 cases ten years later remains relatively 
similar as in 1980, with GRINGOs slightly increasing to 12 percent and RPOrgans decreasing to 44 percent. 
This finding indicates that supposed collective action problems demanding specific types of institutions did 
not change significantly during the general rapid increase of RPIs. Although there is a significant increase 
in numbers of all types of RPIs after 1989, no specific institutional setting responding to a certain collective 
action problem had been established disproportionally more often. 
In conclusion, functional approaches referring to a rapid, substantial, and lasting increase in or change 
of global or regional collective action problems as an explanatory factor fall short of accounting for the 
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sudden growth in the number of RPIs after 1989. From a legitimacy perspective, these findings give rise to 
a first basic conjecture:
It	is	the	diffusion	of	norms	requiring	the	establishment	of	regional	parliamentary	fora	and	not	a	sudden	
increase	of	specific	collective	action	problems	that	triggers	the	global	spread	of	RPIs.
These norms triggering the global spread of RPIs prescribe the enlargement of the range of audiences that 
have an indirect or direct legitimate voice in talk, decisions, and actions in regional integration schemes. 
The audiences can be located on a vertical dimension of the RO (parliamentarians or constituencies) or 
horizontally (other RPIs or organizations in the same or different region). In the same line, the practices of 
legitimacy accompanying this spread of norms may pertain to either functional legitimacy arguments or 
normative legitimacy arguments. On the one hand, functional arguments require actors to establish RPIs as 
strategies of legitimation on the basis of shared legitimacy beliefs because this maximizes the anticipated 
legitimacy of their own preferences vis-à-vis the arguments of their opponents (legitimacy-demand). On 
the other hand, normative arguments speak to a diffusion of principles of legitimacy requiring actors to 
establish RPIs because they are appropriate and in accordance with the norms of the regional and inter-
national society which are widely perceived to carry an obligation rooted in their social validity as rightful. 
The next section builds on this finding and uses the typology of RPIs developed above to elaborate two 
hypotheses referring to either functional or normative legitimacy arguments.
4.2	Hypotheses:	Two	Legitimacy	Arguments
By mapping all cases according to the two theoretically deduced values of the dependent variable, one can 
identify substantial variation, as Figure 5 shows. Firstly, most cases (93 percent) are located on the “indi-
rectly elected” dimension, of which over half (63 percent) are also connected to or officially affiliated with 
an RO. There are no RPIs that have been directly elected and are not connected to or affiliated with an RO. 
Yet, there are five cases (seven percent) of RPIs connected to an RO and elected directly. 
          Regional Parliamentary Institutions | 17
Figure	5: Empirical Distribution of RPIs According to Types
Source: Author.
This leads to the conclusion that the two values of the dependent variable are empirically connected. It ap-
pears to give rise to a functional legitimacy argument: the higher the level of competences of an institution, 
the higher the demand for actors to legitimize it with members chosen on the basis of a higher legitimacy 
norm. This proposition is strongly supported by the finding that there are no RPIs with direct election 
modes but no connections to an RO. Yet, this effect is only very small for RPIs that are connected to an RO 
and directly elected (eleven percent). Additionally, the variable only measures the competences of an RPI 
vis-à-vis an affiliated RO on a nominal scale. To validate this finding, the research design needs to employ 
a more fine-grained scale to measure the actual competences of the RPI that has connections to an RO as 
an explanation for its election mode (see next section). Cases with a high value in this regard should have 
a higher likelihood to be designed according to functional legitimacy arguments. Cases that do not fall into 
this category are more likely to be explained by normative legitimacy arguments. Consequently, this finding 
gives rise to a second basic conjecture:
The	variation	of	the	institutional	design	of	RPIs	can	be	explained	with	different	legitimacy	arguments	for	
institutionalized	regional	integration.
Accordingly, the first variable of interest is the depth of integration in a specific regional society. This vari-
able builds on several institutions such as sovereignty, nationalism as well as transnationalism and multilat-
eralism (Buzan 2004: 182-186). The more a regional society pursues deep integration, the more it will need 
to relax its principles of legitimacy pertaining to sovereignty and nationalism and emphasize more and 
more the norms of transnationalism or supra-nationalism. In order to express the validity of this process of 
integration as rightful and to properly take into account the new competences of its parliamentary organi-
zation, the society will have a demand to adapt its strategies of legitimation embodied in RPIs. Therefore, 
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 80 | August 2017 
the first hypothesis builds on the findings derived from the mapping of all types of RPIs on the theoretically 
deduced typology (connection between election mode and competences). It is informed by a functional 
legitimacy argument stating a legitimacy demand to design RPIs connected to ROs according to the level of 
integration of the prevailing RO in the region. The hypothesis rests on the assumption that actors creating 
these kinds of RPIs employ this organizational structure because it maximizes the anticipated legitimacy of 
their own preferences against the arguments of their opponents.
H11:	Types	of	RPIs	with	an	official	connection	to	an	RO	and/or	elected	on	the	basis	of	direct	suffrage	are	
more	often	connected	to	ROs	with	predominantly	supranational	characteristics.
H01:	The	supranational	characteristics	of	an	RO	are	independently	distributed	across	the	types	of	RPIs	
connected	to	an	RO.
The second variable of interest is the national regime type prevailing in the regional society. This variable 
builds on the institution of nationalism and, more precisely, on democracy and popular sovereignty (Buzan 
2004: 184f). It intersects with direct functional and normative legitimacy arguments. On the one hand, 
the hypothesis expresses a demand for a certain type of institution in a region based on a perceived gap 
between an RO’s authority and its legitimacy or an internal demand by parliamentarians, for example. On 
the other hand, it describes a process of socialization that leads actors to design RPIs in accordance with 
their own prevailing regional norms. From a functional legitimacy perspective, the hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that governmental or parliamentary actors as well as the concerned public demand a specific 
organizational design that fits the RPI’s or its corresponding RO’s competences with the prevailing (demo-
cratic) national institutions. In this sense, it assumes a legitimacy demand because this design maximizes 
the anticipated individual preferences of the actors that are informed and shaped by national regime types. 
From a normative legitimacy perspective, the hypothesis rests on the assumption that actors shaping the 
design of RPIs use and refer to legitimate national norms of political institutions they have been socialized 
in and, hence, regard it as appropriate to employ them in similar contexts. Therefore, it assumes that 
national regime types socialize and condition actors, and that these actors employ national norms when 
arguing in favor of a specific RPI design or use them because they are widely accepted or even habitualized 
in their national and regional environment. 
H12:	The	more	the	prevailing	regime	type	in	a	regional	society	tends	to	parliamentary	democracy,	the	
more	the	RPI	in	that	region	tends	to	be	directly	elected	and	to	gain	more	authority	by	the	virtue	of	being	
connected	to	an	RO.
H02:	The	prevailing	regime	type	in	a	regional	society	is	independently	distributed	across	the	types	of	RPIs.
The last variable of interest is trade in a specific region (Buzan 2004: 183f). The intensity of trade serves 
as a control variable for the theoretical construct of a region focusing on the density of trade interactions 
in a specific region. It rests on the assumption that a region is characterized by transnational interactions 
of various kinds, which is, partially, reflected in its trade relations. In so doing, this variable helps to elimi-
nate outlier regions with small (trade) interaction as well as regions with a (comparatively) extremely high 
interaction. Regions with almost only intra-regional trade and a low dependence on extra-regional trade 
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may have a lower likelihood of exhibiting diffusion of legitimacy norms. In contrast, regions with a very 
low intra-regional trade interaction may not qualify for the theoretical construct of a (at least somewhat 
integrated) region at all.
H1
control
:	Types	of	RPIs	with	an	official	connection	to	an	RO	and/or	elected	on	the	basis	of	a	direct	univer-
sal	suffrage	tend	to	be	more	distributed	across	cases	with	a	high	intra-regional	trade	index.
H0
control
:	The	intra-regional	trade	index	of	an	RPI	is	independently	distributed	across	the	types	of	RPIs.
In order to test these hypotheses, the study applies simple cross-tabulation and the Fisher’s exact test to 
determine significance levels. The Fisher’s exact test is chosen because for some of the pairs the conditions 
for a Chi-square-test with a cell frequency of f
ij 
> 5 are not fully met. The test is run in STATA and always 
returns the two-tailed p-value; the significance level is set at a p-value of α ≤ 0.05.
4.3	Empirical	Findings
The data for the first variable (depth of integration) and the first hypothesis are taken from Hooghe/Marks 
(2015), Lenz (2013), and own research. For the purpose of this research design, the data is transformed into 
an ordinal scale measuring the competences of ROs, with zero being the lowest level and two the highest. 
The cases are then tabulated according to the two empirical types of RPIs that H1
1
 relates to, that is all 
RPOrgans and RPSAs as well as a separated calculation for directly and indirectly elected RPIs.
The data provides no support for H1
1
 and functional legitimacy arguments stating a demand to legitimatize 
RPIs based on higher legitimacy norms because of supranational competences of the parent RO. That is to 
say, considering all 45 cases that H1
1
 relates to, there is no statistically significant relation between the level 
of authority of an RO and the institutional design of RPIs (election mode and general competences vis-à-vis 
the RO). The two-tailed Fisher’s exact returns a p-value of 1.00 for the two different types and 0.262 for 
the election mode (see Tables 2 and 3, significance level α≤ 0.05), which provides no grounds to reject H0
1
 
and thus does not further support H1
1
. Therefore, the distribution of all types of ROs with different levels 
of integration is independent from the distribution of RPIs according to the institutional design. These 
findings also hold for all RPIs established after 1989 (p-value: 0.663 and 0.607 – see Tables 4 and 5). Yet, 
this finding does not state that direct functional legitimacy arguments have never come into play. For the 
cases studied, they are just not statistically significant to explain the distribution and may cover up other 
(indirect or normative) legitimacy arguments. Additionally, this mapping may facilitate the selection of RO 
cases with a low degree of authority and thus assist further research into the possible influences of these 
practices of legitimacy pertaining to diffusion.
The data for the second variable (regime type) and the second hypothesis build on the database of the 
democracy indicator from Cheibub et al. (2010) and own research. The dataset identifies the membership 
of all RPIs and assigns each state a value for regime type on a five-digit ordinal scale ranging from parlia-
mentary democracy to military dictatorship. The median for all member states indicates the regime type 
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value for the region (and RPI). Note that this does not assess the democratic quality of the RPI (and RO) but 
rather the prevailing quality of democracy of national regimes in the region according to the variables enu-
merated above. Therefore, it is an indicator of prevailing (democratic) norms in the region, which should 
(from a theoretical perspective) predict the institutional design of an RPI via (functional and normative) 
practices of legitimacy.
Table	2: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across RPI Types
0 1 2 Grand Total
RPOrgan 14 13 3 30
RPSA 8 6 1 15
Grand Total 22 19 4 45
0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 1.00 
Source: Author.
Table	3: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across Election Mode
0 1 2 Grand Total
Direct 1 3 1 5
Indirect 21 16 3 40
Grand Total 22 19 4 45
0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.262 
Source: Author.
Table	4: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across RPI Types after 1989
0 1 2 Grand Total
RPOrgan 10 10 1 21
RPSA 8 4 0 12
Grand Total 18 14 1 33
0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.663 
Source: Author.
Table	5: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across Election Mode for RPIs after 1989
0 1 2 Grand Total
Direct 1 2 0 3
Indirect 17 12 1 30
Grand Total 18 14 1 33
0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.607 
Source: Author.
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The mapping of the regime types and statistical analysis also refutes H1
2
 since there is no reason to reject 
H0
2
. The clustering of regions with prevailing civilian and military dictatorships that have RPIs with a high 
degree of authority clearly speaks against internal norms, (direct) functional legitimacy arguments as well 
as socialization or habitualization arguments as explanations of a significant effect for the macro distribu-
tion of the institutional design. This statement is supported by the two-tailed p-values of Fisher’s exact 
(0.416 and 0.445, see Tables 6 and 7). The distribution of various types of regimes across the types of RPIs 
does not significantly deviate from the expected standard distribution of all cases across the types of RPIs. 
Moreover, this also holds for all RPIs established after 1989 (p-value: 0.652 and 0.497 see Tables 8 and 9). 
Yet, this finding shows that direct normative legitimacy arguments may also cover up indirect arguments. 
Table	6: Regime Type Distributed across RPI Types
0 1 2 3 4 Grand Total
RPOrgan 9 6 5 6 4 30
RPSA 6 4 3 2 0 15
RPOrganization 1 3 6 4 1 15
GRINGO 2 3 3 0 0 8
Grand Total 18 16 17 12 5 68
0 = Parliamentary Democracy; 1 = Mixed Democracy; 2 = Presidential Democracy; 3 = Civilian Dictatorship; 4 = 
Military Dictatorship 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.416 
Source: Author.
Table	7: Regime Type Distributed across Election Mode
0 1 2 3 4 Grand Total
Direct 1 0 3 1 0 5
Indirect 17 16 14 11 5 63
Grand Total 18 16 17 12 5 68
0 = Parliamentary Democracy; 1 = Mixed Democracy; 2 = Presidential Democracy; 3 = Civilian Dictatorship; 4 = 
Military Dictatorship 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.445 
Source: Author.
Table	8: Regime Type Distributed across RPI Types after 1989
0 1 2 3 4 Grand Total
RPOrgan 4 4 4 6 3 21
RPSA 4 4 2 2 0 12
RPOrganization 1 2 2 4 0 9
GRINGO 1 2 3 0 0 6
Grand Total 10 12 11 12 3 48
0 = Parliamentary Democracy; 1 = Mixed Democracy; 2 = Presidential Democracy; 3 = Civilian Dictatorship; 4 = 
Military Dictatorship 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.652 
Source: Author.
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Table	9: Regime Type Distributed across Election Mode for RPIs after 1989
0 1 2 3 4 Grand Total
Direct 0 0 2 1 0 3
Indirect 10 12 9 11 3 45
Grand Total 10 12 11 12 3 48
0 = Parliamentary Democracy; 1 = Mixed Democracy; 2 = Presidential Democracy; 3 = Civilian Dictatorship; 4 = 
Military Dictatorship 
Fisher’s exact p-value: 0.497 
Source: Author.
The data for the third, control variable (trade intensity) is aggregated from the Regional Integration 
Knowledge System (RIKS) database published by UNU-CRIS (De Lombaerde/Van Langenhove 2005). In or-
der to measure trade intensity, the study uses the Intra-regional trade intensity index (ITII), which is the 
ratio of the intra-regional trade share to the region’s share in the world’s total trade. The index determines 
whether the intra-regional trade share is greater or smaller than would be expected based on the region’s 
overall trade share in world trade. An index below ‘1’ indicates a lower intensity and importance of the 
intra-regional trade than the intensity of the region’s trade with the rest of the world. Accordingly, an index 
above ‘1’ indicates that intra-regional trade is more important and intense compared to the extra-regional 
trade flows. This indicator is employed to neutralize the varying geographical and economic size of the 
regions. The study transforms all metrical values of the index into a five-digit ordinal scale9 and tabulates 
them with all cases.
The mapping shows a substantial variation of intra-regional trade intensity across all types of RPIs. Therefore, 
this mapping provides the study with an understanding (to at least some extent) of the density of regional 
society from the perspective of trade. In addition, treating the trade of a regional society as a control 
variable is justified since there is no significant relation between the intra-regional trade intensity and the 
institutional design of RPIs as the one-tailed Fisher’s exact test returns p-values of 0.559 and 0.108 (see 
Annex for Tables A2 and A3).
5. Discussion
The analysis of the country-level variables (national regime type) as well as the functionally-informed vari-
ables (competences of parent ROs) shows that these factors are not statistically significant in explaining cer-
tain design features of RPIs. Although these factors may have some explanatory power in certain individual 
cases, the macro analysis of 68 globally spread cases provides a more complex and nuanced picture. This 
finding is particularly relevant in the light of the existing literature focusing on the development and em-
powerment of RPIs (see Cofelice 2012; Costa et al. 2013; Navarro 2010; Rocabert et al. 2014; Sabic 2008).
9 The respective values are: 1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01.
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Focusing on this explanatory gap, the observed significant increase of RPIs after 1989 might carry some 
explanatory power for specific design features of globally spread RPIs. This finding points to processes of 
diffusion among these particular kinds of ROs – that is, an inter-dependent decision-making process where 
the adoption and specific design of an RPI in a certain region is influenced by other regions that earlier 
created specific types of RPIs (see in general Risse 2016). From this perspective, the establishment and spe-
cific design of an RPI is neither independent from its regional environment and other RPIs that have been 
established globally, nor only influenced by inherent characteristics of its very own region, as the analysis 
of national regime types or the ROs’ competences shows. 
The variables and mechanisms studied in this paper are established and powerful explanations in the liter-
ature. Yet, the finding on potential interdependent decision-making procedures in the design of RPIs offers 
only first tentative conclusions that call for more in-depth research. In this sense, this paper highlights 
the need for a more nuanced analysis of the development of organizational design features that RPIs pos-
sess. However, this paper does not provide a complete conceptualization and research design to pursue a 
diffusion-based analysis of organizational design features within the context of regionally organized par-
liaments. Nonetheless, the developed typology proved to be a useful tool to study the different design 
features of RPIs. It joins findings from previous research (Cofelice 2012; Kissling 2011) and makes them 
applicable to the IPI literature on causes of organizational designs. A further development of this typologi-
cal understanding promises to be fruitful for a more in-depth study of RPIs’ design features. Additionally, as 
the conceptual part has shown, specific attention should be paid to the inherent quality of legitimacy that 
is incorporated in the specific legitimacy nexus of this kind of parliamentary organizations, as Sabic (2008) 
already mentioned in early research.
6. Conclusion
This paper starts with the observation that purely functionalist approaches have a hard time explaining 
the emergence and the institutional design of RPIs. Therefore, the first part provides a theoretical frame-
work to analyze organizational designs of RPIs by assembling existing theoretical building blocks concerned 
with an institutional legitimacy perspective and concludes on the working mechanisms of legitimacy as an 
underlying current inherent in regional societies. Moreover, it shows that various sets of practices of legit-
imacy lead to strategies of legitimation that are embodied in the institutional design of RPIs. In this vein, 
RPIs provide an influential case to show the underlying working mechanisms of legitimacy for international 
institutions. They also represent a typical case for the analysis of legitimacy in IOs because it is possible to 
isolate purely functional, collective action problem-solving explanations as well as – due to their wide vari-
ation in cases – internal norms arguments. RPIs may have weak influences in the regional arena, but exactly 
that and their genuine parliamentary working mode pave the way to observing the effects of legitimacy 
beliefs they embody in their institutional design.
With this in mind, the second empirical part observes a rapid global spread of RPIs after 1989, which gives 
rise to a conjecture about the global diffusion of legitimacy norms prescribing the establishment of RPIs – 
that is, the widening of a legitimate audience in the regional society and regional integration schemes. The 
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subsequent analysis of 68 globally spread RPIs rejects internal and functional legitimacy arguments as sole 
explanations for the design of these organizations. In addition, the findings also support the basic conjec-
ture about the diffusion of legitimacy norms concerning RPIs, since their emergence after 1989 indicates 
processes of inter-dependent creation and development of these kinds of ROs. This data helps to isolate 
cases that may be best explained with processes of socialization, learning, and mimicry (or short: types of 
diffusion) which show most effectively the workings of legitimacy in organizations.
The purpose of this paper has been to provide an analysis of factors causing the development and influ-
encing some design features of RPIs. In so doing, it has highlighted the weaknesses of the existing (mostly) 
functional as well as country-level perspectives and has provided some building blocks for a diffusion- and 
legitimacy-based approach. This analysis aims at raising awareness for new paths in the research program 
on RPIs. Additionally, this research supports these aims by providing a newly compiled dataset on 68 rea-
sonably selected, globally spread organizations that offers a more nuanced picture on RPIs from a global 
perspective and can be amended for further research purposes.
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Annex
Table	A1: Share of Types of RPIs According to Cohort
Year/Type GRINGO RPOrganization RPSA RPOrgan Grand Total
until 1960 0 % 0 % 50 % 50 % 4
until 1970 11.11 % 22.22 % 33.33 % 33.33 % 9
until 1980 7.14 % 21.43 % 21.43 % 50.00 % 14
until 1990 9.52 % 28.57 % 14.29 % 47.62 % 21
until 2000 15.22 % 21.74 % 21.74 % 41.30 % 46
unitl 2010 11.76 % 22.06 % 22.06 % 44.12 % 68
Source: Author.
Table	A2: Intra-regional Trade Intensity Index Distributed on RPI-Type
1 2 3 4 5 Grand Total
RPOrgan 3 14 6 2 5 30
RPSA 1 10 0 2 2 15
RPOrganization 2 8 2 3 0 15
GRINGO 0 6 1 1 0 8
Grand Total 6 38 9 8 7 68
1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01 
Fisher´s exact p-value: 0.559 
Source:	Author.
Table	A3: Intra-regional Trade Intensity Index Distributed on Election Mode
1 2 3 4 5 Grand Total
Direct 0 1 1 2 1 5
Indirect 6 37 8 6 6 63
Grand Total 6 38 9 8 7 68
1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01 
Fisher´s exact p-value: 0.108 
Source: Author.
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Table	A4: List of Globally Distributed Regional Parliamentary Institutions in the Dataset
No. NAME of the RPI RO connected to, affiliated, 
mostly working with (excluding 
Inter-Parliamentary Institutions)
Type Election 
Mode
Year 
estab-
lished
Integ-
ration
Regime 
Type
Trade
1 ACP Consultative 
Assembly (ACP-CA)
African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP (Group))
RPOrgan indirect 2005 0 2 3
2 ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly 
(JPA)
Cotonou Agreement RPSA indirect 2003 0 2 2
3 African Parliamentary 
Union (APU)
African Union (AU), African 
Economic Community (AEC)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1999 --- 3 3
4 Arab Inter-
Parliamentary Union 
(AIPU)
League of Arab States RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1974 --- 4 4
5 Arab Transitional 
Parliament (ATP)
League of Arab States RPOrgan indirect 2005 1 4 4
6 ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly 
(AIPA)
Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 2007 --- 3 4
7 Asia Pacific 
Parliamentary Forum 
(APPF)
Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), Pacific 
Island Forum, Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC), The 
Pacific Basin Economic Council 
(PBEC)
GRINGO indirect 1993 --- 2 2
8 Asian Forum of 
Parliamentarians 
on Population and 
Development (AFPPD)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1981 --- 2 2
9 Asian -Pacific 
Parliamentarians` Union 
(APPU)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1965 --- 2 2
10 Asian Parliamentary 
Assembly (APA)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 2006 --- 3 2
11 Assemblee 
parlementaire de 
la Francophonie 
(APF) / Francophone 
Parliamentary Assembly
Organisation internationale de la 
Francophonie (OIF)
RPSA indirect 1967 2 2 1
12 Assembly of 
Caribbean Community 
Parliamentarians (ACCP)
Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM)
RPSA indirect 1996 0 0 5
13 Association of Pacific 
Island Legislatures 
(APIL)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1981 --- 1 1
14 Association of 
SAARC Speakers and 
Parliamentarians*
South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
GRINGO indirect 1992 --- 0 4
15 Baltic Assembly (BA) Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM) RPSA indirect 1991 0 0 2
16 Baltic Sea Parliamentary 
Conference (BSPC)
Council of the Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS)
RPSA indirect 1991 0 0 2
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17 Barents Parliamentary 
Conferences
Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
(BEAR)
GRINGO indirect 1997 --- 1 2
18 CEMAC Parlement 
Communautaire / 
CEMAC Community 
Parliament (CEMAC-CP)
Communaute Economique et 
Monetaire d‘Afrique Centrale 
(CEMAC) / Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central 
Africa
RPOrgan indirect 2010 1 4 5
19 Cetinje Parliamentary 
Forum
Stability Pact of South Eastern 
Europe (SEE)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 2004 --- 1 3
20 Comite 
Interparlementaire de 
l‘Union Economique 
et Monetaire Ouest 
Africaine / UEMOA 
Interparliamentary 
Committee (UEMOA-IC)
Union Economique et Monetaire 
Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) / West 
African Economic and Monetary 
Union
RPOrgan indirect 1998 1 2 5
21 Committee of Members 
of Parliament of the 
EFTA Countries (CMP) – 
advisory
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)
RPOrgan indirect 1977 0 0 1
22 Committee of Members 
of Parliament of the 
EFTA States Party to EEA 
(MPS) – consultative
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)
RPOrgan indirect 1994 0 0 1
23 Conference des 
organes specialises 
dans les affaires 
communautaires et 
europeennes des 
Parlements de l‘Union 
europenne (COSAC)
European Union (EU) RPOrgan indirect 1989 2 0 2
24 Conference of 
Parliamentarians of the 
Arctic Region (CPAR)
Arctic Council RPSA indirect 1993 0 1 2
25 Conference of Speakers 
of the European Union 
Parliament*
European Union (EU) GRINGO indirect 1963 --- 0 2
26 Conference of Speakers 
of West African 
Parliaments*
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)
GRINGO indirect 1999 --- 2 3
27 Conseil Consultatif de 
l‘Union du Maghreb 
Arabe / Consultative 
Council of the Arab 
Maghreb Union
Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) 
/ Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
RPOrgan indirect 1989 0 4 2
28 Conseil 
interparlementaire 
consultatif de Benelux 
/ Benelux Consultative 
Interparliamentary 
Council (Benelux 
Parliament)
Benelux (Benelux Economic 
Union)
RPSA indirect 1955 1 0 2
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29 East African Legislative 
Assembly of the East 
African Community 
(EALA)
East African Community (EAC) RPOrgan direct 2001 1 3 5
30 EEA Joint Parliamentary 
Committee (EEA-JPC)
European Economic Area (EEA) RPOrgan indirect 1994 1 0 2
31 Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly 
(EMPA)
Union for the Mediterranean RPSA indirect 2004 1 1 2
32 European Parliament 
(EP) (of the European 
Union)
European Union (EU) RPOrgan direct 1976 2 0 2
33 European Conference 
of Residents of 
Parliaments*
Council of Europe (CoE) GRINGO indirect 1988 --- 1 2
34 Forum of Portuguese 
Speaking Parliaments 
(FPLP)
Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries (CPLP)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1998 --- 2 1
35 GUAM Parliamentary 
Assembly (GUAM-PA)
GUAM Organization for 
Democracy and Economic 
Development
RPOrgan indirect 2004 0 1 3
36 IGAD Inter- 
Parliamentary Union 
(IPU-IGAD)*
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD)
RPSA indirect 2007 1 3 5
37 Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly of Member 
Nations of the 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(IPA-CIS)
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)
RPOrgan indirect 1992 0 3 2
38 Interparliamentary 
Assembly of the 
Eurasian Economic 
Community (IPA 
EurAsEC)
Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC)
RPOrgan indirect 2000 0 3 2
39 Interparliamentary 
Assembly on Orthodoxy 
(IAO)
--- GRINGO indirect 1993 --- 1 2
40 Interparliamentary 
Committee on the 
Dutch Language Union 
(NTU)
Dutch Language Union (NTU) RPOrgan indirect 1980 0 1 2
41 Inter-Parliamentary 
Forum of the 
Americas (Foro 
Interparlamentario de 
las Américas, FIPA)
Organization of American States 
(OAS)
GRINGO indirect 2001 --- 2 2
42 NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly (NATO-PA)
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization)
RPSA indirect 1955 1 0 2
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43 Network of 
Parliamentarians of the 
Economic Community 
of Central African States 
(REPAC)
Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS)
RPOrgan indirect 2002 1 4 5
44 Network of 
Parliamentary 
Committees for 
Woman and Men in the 
European Union (NCEO), 
(CCEO)
European Union (EU) RPOrgan indirect 1997 2 0 2
45 Nordic Council Nordic Cooperation RPOrgan indirect 1952 0 0 3
46 OECS Assembly Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States
RPOrgan indirect 2010 1 0 5
47 OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly (OSCE-PA)
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
RPOrgan indirect 1991 1 1 2
48 PACE enlarged debate 
on the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(PACE-OECD)
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
(OECD)
RPOrgan indirect 1962 1 0 2
49 Pacific Parliamentary 
Assembly on Population 
and Development 
(PPAPD)
Pacific Island Forum (PIF) RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1997 --- 0 2
50 Pan-African Parliament 
(PAP)
African Union (AU) RPOrgan indirect 2004 1 3 3
51 Parlamento Amazónico 
/ Amazonian Parliament
Amazon Cooperation Treaty 
Organization (ACTO)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1989 --- 2 2
52 Parlamento Andino 
(Parlandino) / Andean 
Parliament
Comunidad Andino (CAN) / 
Andean Community
RPOrgan direct 1979 1 2 4
53 Parlamento 
Centroamericano 
(Parlacen) / Central 
American Parliament
Sistema de la Integracion 
Centroamericana (SICA) / Central 
American Integration System
RPSA direct 1991 1 2 4
54 Parlamento del 
MERCOSUR (Parlasur) 
/ MERCOSUR Parliament
Mercado Comun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR)
RPOrgan direct 2006 0 2 3
55 Parlamento 
Latinoamericano 
(Parlatino) / Latin 
American Parliament
Comunidad Latinoamericana de 
Naciones (CLAN)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1964 --- 2 2
56 Parliament of the 
Economic Community 
of West African 
States (Community 
Parliament)
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)
RPOrgan indirect 2000 1 2 3
57 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Community of 
Portuguese Language 
Countries (PA-CPLP)
Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries (CPLP)
RPOrgan indirect 2007 0 1 1
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58 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe 
(PACE)
Council of Europe (CoE) RPOrgan indirect 1949 1 1 2
59 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Mediterranean 
(PAM)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 2006 --- 2 2
60 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Organization of 
the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (PABSEC)
Organization of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
RPSA indirect 1993 0 1 2
61 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Organization of 
the Collective Security 
Treaty (PA-OCST)
Organization of the Collective 
Security Treaty (OCST)
RPOrgan indirect 2006 0 3 2
62 Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Russia-Belarus 
Union State
Union State (of Russia and 
Belarus)
RPOrgan indirect 1997 0 3 2
63 Parliamentary 
Cooperation in South-
Eastern Europe (SEE)
South-East European 
Cooperation Process (SEECP)
RPSA indirect 2008 0 1 2
64 Parliamentary 
Dimension of the 
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative 
(AII)
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) RPSA indirect 2001 0 0 2
65 Parliamentary 
Dimension of the 
Central European 
Initiative (CEI)
Central European Initiative (CEI) RPOrgan indirect 1990 0 1 2
66 Parliamentary Union 
of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference 
Member States (PUIC)
Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)
RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 1999 --- 3 2
67 SADC Parliamentary 
Forum (SADC-PF)
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)
RPSA indirect 1993 1 3 4
68 South Caucasus 
Parliamentary Initiative 
(SCIP)
--- RPOrgani-
zation
indirect 2003 0 1 4
* Speakers’ Conference 
Source: Author.
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